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Abstract
Social grants are an important instrument of social protection in South Africa, reaching millions of the poor each
month. Although social grants have been found to reduce poverty and promote human development, considerable un-
certainty remains about some of their incentive effects. This study uses a sample of 984 rural households selected from
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, to investigate the potential incentive/dis-incentive effects of social grant-dependency
on rural households’ participation in farming activities. The data are analysed using the generalised propensity score
(GPS) matching method and ordinary least squares. The results showed that the effect of social-grant dependency on
households’ farm participation levels varies at different dependency levels. While social grants had a negative effect on
the households’ farming participation levels when social grants income contribute 20–60 %, they had a positive effect
at lower (< 20 %) and higher (> 60 %) dependency levels. The positive effect of social grants at the lower and higher
levels supports the hypothesis that social grant beneficiaries use part of the grant income to alleviate financial con-
straints in agricultural production. However, the negative effect at the 20–60% dependency levels is consistent with
the dis-incentive hypothesis, suggesting that social grants may generate dis-incentives to farm production. The study
identified several policy variables that affect the participation of rural households in smallholder farming activities,
highlighting the importance of expectations of farming success as a key motivator.
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1 Introduction
Social grants are an important instrument of social
protection in South Africa, benefiting over 16 million
South Africans each month in 2014 (SASSA, 2014).
There are seven different grants: the old age grant,
child support grant, disability grant, war veterans’ grant,
foster care grant, care dependency grant, and grant-in-
aid (ibid). Eligibility for social grants is dependent on
an income and asset-based means test, which varies ac-
cording to the grant, the marital status of the beneficiary
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and other characteristics. Despite these means tests, the
majority of South Africans are eligible to receive these
grants (Abel, 2013). The child support grants have the
largest number of beneficiaries, reaching over 11.5 mil-
lion beneficiaries in 2014. However, it pays the least
amount to individual beneficiaries, R 320 per month in
2014 per beneficiary (equivalent to about US$ 30 using
the 2014 exchange rate) (SASSA, 2014).
The old age grant, which benefitted over 3 million
people in 2014, pays the largest amount (R 1350 per be-
neficiary, equivalent to about US$ 120). The remaining
grant types benefit fewer beneficiaries than the above
two, and they pay amounts equal to or ranging between
the two grant types. Although South Africa’s social
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grants have been found to address the poor’s immediate
basic needs, reduce poverty and promote human devel-
opment (Neves et al., 2009; Samson, 2009), consider-
able uncertainty remains about some of their incentive
effects (van der Berg et al., 2010). Conventional eco-
nomic theory suggests that social grants may undermine
the incentives of the poor to participate in economic ac-
tivities, such as farming, by reducing the opportunity
cost of failing to do so (Samson et al., 2004). Social
grants may affect people’s social and economic behav-
iour negatively and entrench a culture of dependency
and entitlement (Gomersall, 2013). This is especially
the case if the beneficiaries depend on social grants for
many years.
Even though social grants in South Africa are targeted
at specific vulnerable groups, such as the old, young,
orphans and the sick, the potential for spill-over effects
among household members has been noted by several
researchers in the past (Klasen & Woolard, 2008; Abel,
2013; Devereux, 2013). According to Devereux (2013),
the spill-over effects result in many unemployed or un-
derpaid adults depending on these grants, i.e., becom-
ing dependent on social grants beneficiaries. The con-
cern, therefore, is that access to social grants by one or
two household members may result in prime-aged, able-
bodied household members choosing not to participate
in economic activities, or reducing their work hours.
The debate in literature on the potential disincentive
effects of the social grants on labour supply has been
inconclusive. On one hand, some studies (e.g., Posel
et al., 2006; Williams, 2007; Ardington et al., 2009,
2013) have concluded that additional income from so-
cial grants has a positive impact on employment by eas-
ing the constraints associated with job search. On the
other hand, others (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2003; Abel,
2013) have concluded that social grants reduce incen-
tives to work, as the additional income from social
grants causes household members to work less and take
additional leisure. In general, the previous studies have
focused on the incentives of household members to en-
gage in formal job activity, ignoring the incentives to
engage in informal activities such as smallholder farm-
ing.
Given South Africa’s high unemployment rates,
which has been over 26 % in the past 10 years (Herring-
ton et al., 2015), limited prospects for labour absorp-
tion in the off-farm sector (Aliber & Hall, 2012), and
that the government has prioritised the expansion of the
smallholder farming sector as part of its broader job cre-
ation strategy (DED, 2011), the incentives to work can-
not be fully captured if the smallholder farming sector
is ignored. Most of the rural people are self-employed
in informal activities such as smallholder farming (Gol-
lin, 2014), implying that studies on incentives to work
should also consider this fact. Also, most of the recent
social grant impact studies in South Africa, with the ex-
ception of Agüero et al. (2007), have focused on evalu-
ating causal effects of a binary treatment, i.e., a dummy
variable showing whether or not a household has access
to grants. A weakness of the binary treatment approach
is that it does not account for the heterogeneous effects
of social grants, as it classifies all social grants recipient
households in the same way, irrespective of the level of
social grant support (Agüero et al., 2007; Bia & Mattei,
2012).
Therefore, this study aimed to contribute to the litera-
ture on social grants impacts by investigating the extent
to which social grant-dependency affect rural house-
holds’ incentives to participate in farming activities in
the KwaZulu-Natal province. Social grant-dependency
was defined as the extent to which social grants con-
tribute to household income. The study’s contribution
to the literature is in three ways. Firstly, the study fo-
cuses on the smallholder farming sector, which has not
been adequately investigated by the social grant impact
studies. Secondly, the study uses the continuous treat-
ment approach, instead of the limited binary treatment
approaches. Lastly, the study uses the proportion of all
the social grants to household income, thus capturing
the importance of all the social grants to household in-
come. Previous social grant studies (e.g., Posel et al.,
2006; Agüero et al., 2007; Abel, 2013) have mostly fo-
cused on the impact of, mostly, one or a few of the so-
cial grants. This study argues that it is the relative im-
portance of the social grant that influences household
behaviour as it better captures the level of social grant-
dependency compared to the absolute amount of social
grants income.
2 Materials and methods
2.1 Data
The multi-stage random sampling technique was ad-
opted in this study to draw a sample of 984 farming
households from four districts in the KwaZulu-Natal
(KZN) province of South Africa. Firstly, four districts
were purposively chosen out of the 11 districts in KZN.
The four districts that were selected were Harry Gwala,
Umzinyathi, Umkhanyakude and Uthukela. These dis-
tricts have a significant number of rural communities
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engaged in smallholder farming activities. Secondly, a
total of 984 households were randomly selected from
the four districts. The lists of farmers were obtained
from the respective local offices of KZN’s Department
of Agriculture. The total sample comprised of 239
households from Umzinyathi, 191 from Uthukela, 143
from Umkhanyakude and 411 from Harry Gwala dis-
tricts. The number of households sampled was propor-
tional to the number of farming households in the se-
lected districts. The data were collected using a pre-
tested structured questionnaire. The questionnaire cap-
tured the farmers’ main information used to generate
variables.
2.2 Dependent and independent variables
The dependent variable, capturing households partici-
pation in farming activities, was proxied by the total
number of man-day equivalents the household members
were involved in crop farming activities in the previ-
ous 60 days, following Abdulai et al. (2005). The 60-
day period was considered short enough for the house-
holds to recall easily and give relatively accurate and re-
liable responses. The two months under study, October
and November, represent the peak periods of labour de-
mand for land preparation, cultivation and planting the
summer crops. A man-day of work was defined as the
amount of farm work that can be carried out by an adult
male in an 8-hour work period (ILCA, 1990). The con-
version factors (weights) applied to males and females
in different age groups and carrying out different farm-
ing tasks to express labour time in terms of man-days
were those presented in Panin (1986).
To capture social grant-dependency, the treatment
variable, the study used the proportion of household in-
come from social grants. The fact that social grants
are given to individuals in households, and that different
households differ in terms of the number of social grant
beneficiaries leads to a high degree of heterogeneity in
contribution levels received by households. Treating a
household that receives just 10 % of its income from so-
cial grants the same as a household that receives more
than 50 % of its income from grants seems likely to un-
derstate the potential effect of social grants. The propor-
tion variable used in this study captures this variation.
The econometric models included other variables that
were hypothesised to influence households’ decision-
making processes and incentives to participate in farm-
ing. Since the labour variable focused on the partici-
pation of family labour on crop farming activities, live-
stock farming was controlled for by including livestock
size as one of the explanatory variables in the model.
Off-farm commitments, captured as off-farm employ-
ment and off-farm business ownership, were also con-
trolled for by entering these variables as explanatory
variables.
2.3 Estimation methods
The generalised propensity score (GPS) method was
used to estimate the impact of social grant-dependency
on household members’ participation in farming activ-
ities. The use of experimental or randomised designs
is not applicable when studying social grants in South
Africa because the social grants were not implemented
with an experimental design (Agüero et al., 2007; Pa-
tel et al., 2013). The GPS is the conditional probab-
ility of receiving a particular dosage level given a set
of observable variables (Imbens, 2000; Hirano & Im-
bens, 2004). The GPS method was applied under the
un-confoundedness assumption that adjusting for differ-
ences in a set of observed pre-treatment variables re-
moves all biases in comparisons by different levels of
social grant-dependency. Compared to estimates based
on full samples, the impact estimates based on matched
samples are less biased and more reliable (Rubin &
Thomas, 2000).
The GPS matching method was estimated following
Hirano & Imbens (2004), using a Stata ado file de-
veloped by Bia & Mattei (2008). The estimation proced-
ure consisted of three main steps. The first step involved
estimation of the propensity score. To estimate the con-
ditional distribution of the level of dependency on social
grants, it was assumed that the level of dependency on








where Ti is the level of dependency on social grants (the
treatment variable), g(Ti) is a suitable transformation of
the level of dependency on social grants, h(γ, Xi) is a
function of covariates (Xi) with linear and higher-order
terms, which depends on a vector of parameters, γ, and
σ is the standard deviation. The higher-order terms
were included to obtain an estimate of the GPS that
satisfies the balancing property (Bia & Mattei, 2008).
The tests for normality and the balancing property were
done to ensure that these assumptions were met before
estimating the GPS. An important assumption of the
GPS method is that adjusting for differences in a set
of observed variables removes all biases in compari-
sons by different level of dependency on social grants
(unconfoundedness). To strengthen the plausibility of
this strong unconfoundedness assumption, a rich num-
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ber of covariates was introduced in the estimation of the
propensity score.








g(Ti) − h(γ̂, Xi)
]
, (2)
where R̂i is the estimated score, and other variables and
parameters are as defined before. σ̂ and γ̂ are the par-
ameters estimated in Eq. (1).
The second main step of the GPS matching technique
involved estimating the conditional expectation of the
outcome Yi (household’s participation in farming activ-
ities in man-day equivalents), given the level of depend-
ency on social grants (Ti) and the GPS (Ri). The con-
ditional expectation of the outcome was estimated as a
function of the two scalar variables, T i and Ri, as fol-
lows:
ϕ [E(Yi|Ti,Ri)] = ψ(Ti,Ri, α) , (3)
where ϕ(.) is a link function that relates the predictor,
ψ(Ti,Ri, α) to the conditional expectation, α are the par-
ameters to be estimated using the polynomial approx-
imations, and other variables are as defined before. As
suggested by Bia & Mattei (2008), the polynomial ap-
proximations of order higher than three were not used.
The final step involved estimating the dose-response
function. The estimated regression function was aver-
aged over the score function and evaluated at the desired
level of the treatment. The average potential outcome
(dose-response function) for each level of dependency
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where α̂ is the vector of the estimated parameters in the
second stage and other variables and parameters are as
described above. The analysis here used variation in the
extent of level of dependency on social grants (the treat-
ment) to identify the causal impact.
For robustness checks as well as to investigate other
factors that determine the participation levels of rural
households in farming activities, ordinary least squares
(OLS) was used to estimate the following equation:
Yi = βxi + δTi + εi , (5)
where Yi is the number of man-days the household
members were engaged in farming activities, T i is the
proportion of household income from social grants, x i
is a vector of household characteristics, β’s and δ are
parameters to be estimated and ε i is the residual term.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of the 984 sampled house-
holds. The table shows that the age of the rural farming
households’ heads was 56 years, on average, and that
47 % of households were male-headed. The sampled
household heads attained low levels of education, and
only 20 % were employed. On average, 0.97 prime-
aged, able-bodied household members, representing
just over 25 % of the total 3.67 prime-aged, able-bodied
household members, were employed in the off-farm
sector, highlighting the lack of economic opportunities
in the rural areas. This underscores the importance of
smallholder farming as a livelihood option among the
rural households. The households spent an average of
36 man-days on farming activities in the previous 60
days.
The households had access to small land sizes (2 ha),
and practiced both crop farming and livestock rearing.
Maize was grown by most of the farmers (78 %) the
season prior to the survey. Further crops cultivated in-
cluded beans (56 %), spinach (53 %), onions (46 %), to-
matoes (43 %), cabbages (38 %), potatoes (26 %), but-
ternut (18 %) and beetroot (14 %). A significant propor-
tion of the households practiced some form of irrigation.
Some were members of smallholder irrigation schemes,
while others watered their crops (such as spinach, toma-
toes, etc.) using cans and hosepipes. The households
owned moderate livestock sizes, with cattle (mean= 3),
goats (mean= 5) and chickens (mean= 10) being the
main animals kept. Cattle and goats are driven to com-
munal grazing areas every morning to feed and collec-
ted at sunset, while the chickens fend for food around
the yard.
The majority (84 %) of the households had access to
social grants. On average, each household had about
three social grants beneficiaries, showing the important
role of social grants among rural households, in view
of household size of seven. Social grants contributed
significantly (38 %) to household income, which is big-
ger than the contribution of farming (13 %). The house-
holds reported poor access to markets and support ser-
vices such as training, extension and credit. Few house-
holds hired people to help with their farming activities.
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Table 1: Household descriptive variables and their means (n = 984).
Variable name Variable description Mean SD
Age Household head age (Years) 56 13
Gender Household head gender (1=Male) 0.47 –
Marital status Household head marital status (1=Married) 0.46 –
Education level Household head education level (Years of schooling) 4.67 4.17
Household size Household size (Numbers) 7.04 3.60
Employment status of HH head Household head off-farm employment (1=Yes) 0.20 –
Total family labour Able-bodied, prime-aged household members 3.61 2.30
Number of employed HH members Able-bodied household members employed off-farm 0.97 1.32
Farm labour Household participation in farming activities in the
last 60 days (Man-day equivalents)
36.37 21.84
Access to grants Access to social grants (1=Yes) 0.84 –
Grants beneficiaries Number of social grant beneficiaries per household 3.18 1.81
Land size Land size household has access to (ha) 1.90 4.47
Livestock size Livestock size per household (TLUs) 3.53 17.40
Assets Value of assets (Rands†) 82 105 38 937
Total income Total annual household income (Rands†) 46 757 32 707
Income from grants Annual income from grants (Rands†) 16 916 15 877
Income from farming Annual income from farm activities (Rands†) 6553 12 438
Social grant income proportion Proportion of income from social grants 0.38 0.26
Farm income proportion Proportion of income from farming activities 0.13 0.14
Farming experience Household head farming experience (Years) 18.70 13.28
Hire labour Hiring in farm labour (1=Yes) 0.37 –
Rainfall Perceived rainfall (1=Good) 0.67 –
Soil quality Perceived soil quality (1=Good) 0.55 –
Tenure Secured land tenure (1=Yes) 0.37 –
Tillage access Tillage access (1=Yes) 0.45 –
Market access Market access (1=Yes) 0.20 –
Group membership Farmer association member (1=Yes) 0.42 –
Credit access Access to credit (1=Yes) 0.36 –
Extension access Access to extension (1=Yes) 0.46 –
Training Access to agricultural training (1=Yes) 0.41 –
Off-farm business Small off-farm business ownership (1=Yes) 0.08 –
Irrigation access Access to water for watering crops (1=Yes) 0.46 –
Distance to road Distance to the nearest all-weather road (km) 17.75 39.93
Harry Gwala Harry Gwala district (1=Harry Gwala) 0.42 –
Umzinyathi Umzinyathi district (1=Umzinyathi) 0.24 –
Uthukela Uthukela district (1=Uthukela) 0.19 –
Umkhanyakude Umkhanyakude (1=Umkhanyakude) 0.15 –
Notes: † Exchange rate: R 11.28=US$ 1; TLU: Tropical Livestock Unit, HH: household
Most of the farmers perceived their soils to be fertile and
rainfall to be good.
The results also showed low levels of off-farm entre-
preneurship among the interviewed households, as only
a small proportion of households owned some micro-
business ventures such as weaving, handicrafts and tuck
shops. The roads were generally poor and inaccessible
in the study areas, with many rural households found
far from the nearest all-weather road. These roads to
the households are generally inaccessible by car, with
households having to use wheelbarrows or bicycles to
get to the all-weather roads.
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3.2 The impact of social grant-dependency on farming
participation levels: The generalised propensity
score (GPS) method results
Before presenting the GPS results, a mean compari-
son of households’ farm participation levels at three
levels of social grant-dependency was done and results
are presented in Table 2. The table shows that only
155 of the total sampled households were not recipi-
ents of any type of social grant, representing 16 % of
the sample. A significant proportion (36 %) of the total
sampled huseholds derived more than 50 % of their in-
come from social grants, while 48 % received less than
50 % of their income from social grants. The results in-
dicate progressive decline in participation levels as the
contribution of social grants to household income in-
creases. While this suggest that households participate
less in farming acitivities as they become more depend-
ent on social grants, this result should not be accepted
yet as the confounding factors were not controlled for.
The GPS approach was implemented following Bia
& Mattei (2008) and the results are presented in Fig. 1.
The tests for normality and balancing property indicated
that these assumptions were satisfied. Figure 1 shows
the average dose-response and treatment effect functions
and the 95 % confidence bands for farm participation
levels. The confidence bands were based on 100 boot-
strap replications to account for the uncertainty associ-
ated with the estimation of the GPS and the parameters,
as suggested by previous studies (Bia & Mattei, 2008,
2012).
Table 2: Mean comparisons of household farm participation according to social grant-dependency.
Variables




(< 50 %) from
grants (n = 478)
High income
(> 50 %) from
grants (n = 351)
F test
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Man days over the last 60 days 39.55 23.64 37.08 21.92 34.04 20.72 3.86∗∗
∗∗means significant at 5 % significance levels.
Fig. 1: The average dose-response and treatment functions and 95 % confidence bands for the number of
man-days the household members were engaged in farming activities during the last 60 days.
Notes: E[Farm labour(t)] means the average number of man-days household members were engaged in farming activ-
ities at treatment level t, while treatment level means the contribution level of social grants income to total household
income. The E[Farm labour(t+0.1)] −E[Farm labour(t)] shows the average effect of a social grant contribution in-
crease of 10 % to household income on the household’s farm participation level.
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The confidence bands are narrow in the 0–80 % range,
implying that the results are reliable up to 80 %. The
wide 95 % confidence bands imply a high level of un-
certainty. As such, the shape of the graph after dosages
greater than 80 % should be considered with caution,
and was not interpreted in this study.
The results showed that the effect of social grant-
dependency is not uniform at different treatment levels.
Figure 1 shows that increasing treatment (i.e., increas-
ing dependency on social grants) is associated with in-
creasing participation at lower (0–20%) and higher (60–
80 %) treatment levels. The implication is that the add-
itional income from social grants, at lower and higher
levels of social grant-dependency, plays a positive role
in motivating households to participate more in farming.
At lower levels, the social grant income is not signifi-
cant enough to create a dependency syndrome. On the
other hand, at higher levels, the households are poorer
and have fewer other income sources, such that house-
holds must look for economic activities to augment their
inadequate income. However, Fig. 1 indicate that add-
itional income from social grants results in decreased
incentives to supply more family labour to farming at
dosages between 20 and 60 %.
3.3 The impact of social grant-dependency on farming
participation levels: Ordinary least squares (OLS)
results
Table 3 presents the OLS results estimated for robust-
ness checks on the GPS matching results as well as to
investigate the determinants of households’ farm partici-
pation levels. The highly significant F statistic indicates
that, collectively, the variables are significant determin-
ants of farm participation, suggesting good model fit.
The tests for collinearity were done using variance in-
flation factors (VIFs), and they indicated that there was
little evidence of severe multi-collinearity among other
variables. Heteroscedasticity was remedied by report-
ing robust standard errors. The Hausman test indicated
that the level of dependency on social grants was not
endogenous in the model. The results indicate a nega-
tive relationship between dependency on social grants
and household participation in farming activities. Even
though the GPS results indicated that this negative rela-
tionship applies only when households receive between
20 and 60 % of their income from social grants, the
OLS results indicated that this relationship dominates
on average.
The results showed that the relationship between the
age of the household head and farming participation
levels is non-linearly. This means that households are
Table 3: The impact of social grant-dependency on household
farm participation, OLS results (n = 984).
Variables Coef. Std. Err.
Social grant income proportion −3.985 ∗∗ 1.914
Age −1.090 ∗∗∗ 0.346
Age2 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.003
Gender 1.484 1.495
Education level −0.094 0.189
Marital status 2.351 1.493
Total family labour 2.167 ∗∗∗ 0.203
Hired labour −1.112 ∗∗∗ 0.246
Employment status of HH head −3.035 ∗ 1.768
Number of employed HH members −1.627 ∗∗∗ 0.542
Off-farm business 5.647 ∗∗ 2.860
Farming experience 0.044 0.053
Land size 0.900 0.626
Livestock size −0.034 ∗∗ 0.019
Assets 0.298 0.857
Rainfall −1.044 1.696
Soil quality 1.112 ∗∗∗ 0.364
Tillage access −3.109 ∗∗∗ 1.320
Market access 2.206 ∗ 1.339
Group membership 5.145 ∗∗∗ 1.687
Credit access 1.125 ∗∗∗ 0.372
Extension access 3.909 ∗∗∗ 1.365
Training 0.958 1.564
Distance to road 0.033 0.019
Irrigation access 3.699 ∗∗∗ 1.345
Umzinyathi 0.010 1.961







Hausman test: F = 1.43, p = 0.23
Notes: ∗∗∗ means significant at 1 %; ∗∗ means significant at 5 %;
∗ means significant at 10 % significance levels
less likely to decrease their farm participation up to a
certain age of the household head. However, after the
household head reaches a particular age, more house-
hold members become involved in farming activities.
This can be explained in terms of the earning opportun-
ities of the household head. At younger ages, additional
years mean more experience and connections, such that
the household head accumulates opportunities. Such op-
portunities result in the household becoming less reli-
ant on smallholder farming, hence less commitment to
farming. However, at older years, the household head
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is retiring or about to retire. The likely loss of income
due to the head retiring forces households to be more
involved in farming activities.
The results showed a positive relationship between
total family labour and farm participation. This is ex-
pected, since higher number of able-bodied, prime-aged
household members imply increased labour availabil-
ity, which results in an increase in the number of man-
days supplied to farming. The results also demonstrate
that those households who hired in labour supplied less
household labour to farming activities. This is because
hired labour substitute for family labour, such that in-
creasing hired labour leads to decreased farm partici-
pation by household members.
The employment status of the household head as well
as the number of employed family members had nega-
tive estimated coefficients. This indicates that family
members engage less in farming when the household
head or a greater number of household members are
employed off-farm. The explanation here is that house-
holds where members are employed in the off-farm sec-
tor have less remaining labour time to supply to farming
activities. Moreover, these households are less depend-
ent on farming, and therefore less committed to farming.
Ownership of a off-farm small business had a positive
estimated coefficient, suggesting a positive relationship
between off-farm businesses and farming.
The results showed a negative relationship between
livestock size and household farm participation levels.
A bigger livestock size implies a wealthier household,
and increasing wealth is associated with decreasing de-
pendency on crop farming only. As such, household
members become less committed to crop farming as the
household becomes wealthier. As expected, access to
tillage services reduces the participation of household
members involved in farming. Access to tractors or ani-
mals for draught power reduces the work burden and/or
drudgery. Households with access to tillage services
such as tractors require fewer people to perform farming
activities such as land preparation compared to house-
holds that rely on manual labour for the same tasks.
The households who felt that their soils were of good
quality supplied more labour to farming activities than
those who felt otherwise. The reason is that better
soils increase the prospects of better yields, such that
the households with good land quality, expecting bet-
ter yields, would participate more in farming than those
with poor soils. The results also indicate that access
to the market motivates rural households to participate
more in farming activities. Members of farmer groups
supplied more family labour to farming than those who
are not members. This is because association member-
ship may help the individual farmers through pooling
of resources and sharing of knowledge and experiences.
The significant credit access estimate highlights the im-
portance of credit support to the success of smallholder
producers.
Access to extension is a motivator for households to
become more involved in farming, hence the positive es-
timated coefficient. The same explanation applies to the
positive estimated coefficient of irrigation access. Ac-
cess to irrigation implies reduced chances of crop fail-
ure, higher productivity as well as higher expected rev-
enues, hence more family members are likely to be in-
volved in farming. Compared to Harry Gwala, the re-
sults indicate that households in the Uthukela district
supplied less family labour to farming. The result may
be indicative of the differences in economic opportunit-
ies between the two districts, suggesting that households
in Uthukela district are less dependent on farming than
those in Harry Gwala district.
4 Discussion
This paper examines the extent to which social grant-
dependency has incentive / dis-incentive impacts on
rural households’ incentives to participate in farming
activities. The paper addresses this issue by focusing
on the causal effect of receiving different amounts of
social grants to households and the subsequent relative
importance of social grants income to the households.
The GPS results indicate that the effect of social-grant
dependency on households’ farm participation levels
differs at different dependency levels. This indicates
the importance of moving beyond the dummy variable
showing whether or not a household had access to social
grants, as this would have failed to show these hetero-
geneities at different social grant-dependency levels.
The GPS matching approach indicates that while so-
cial grants have a negative effect on farming partici-
pation when social grants income contribute 20–60%,
they had a positive effect at lower and higher depend-
ency levels. This suggests that increasing income from
social grants motivates households to participate more
in farming at lower and higher levels of social grant-
dependency. Whereas households may be forced to par-
ticipate at higher levels of dependency, as this implies
poorer households, the study findings suggest that so-
cial grants may play a positive role if their contribution
levels are kept below 20 % of household income. The
positive effect of social grants at the lower and higher
treatment levels is consistent with the presence of credit
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constraints that limit poor rural households’ ability to
engage in economic activities, supporting the hypothesis
that social grant beneficiary households use some of the
grant income to alleviate financial constraints in agricul-
tural production.
This result is consistent with several studies (e.g.,
Devereux, 2002; Lund, 2002; Woolard, 2003; Diao et
al., 2012; Mabugu et al., 2014; Proctor, 2014), that
have reported that social grants can promote livelihoods
and enhance economic activities by easing the finan-
cial constraints facing the poor - the so-called ‘irrigation
function’ of social security. This suggests that social
grants have the potential to complement livelihood ac-
tivities such as farming as options for rural livelihoods in
Africa. This is supported by Sinyolo et al. (2016a) who
found that the households with access to social grants
adopt more modern technologies such as inorganic fer-
tilisers compared to households without access to social
grants. However, findings from Sinyolo et al. (2016b)
suggest that the increase in technology use due to ac-
cess to social grants is not associated with increase in
land under cultivation, as the study found no significant
impact of social grants on the proportion of land culti-
vated. Similarly, the results of this current study sug-
gests that the increase in household members particip-
ating in farming activities does not necessarily result in
increasing proportion of land cultivated by households.
The GPS results also suggest that social grants have
a dis-incentive effect when they contribute between 20
and 60 % to household income. This result supports
other studies (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2003; Abel, 2013),
which reported that an increase in social grants income
increases the reservation wage and lowers labour force
participation. This implies that, at least some of the so-
cial grant income that is, in theory, targeted towards the
elderly, young or sick, ends up being redistributed (as
cash or food, etc.) towards the working-age members of
the household. The result of this intra-family redistri-
bution is a significant reduction of the number of man-
days that the household members engage in smallholder
farming activities when social grants contribute between
20 and 60 % to household income.
The study identified key variables that affect the
participation levels of rural households in smallholder
farming. In general, the study highlighted the import-
ance of expectations of success in motivating house-
holds to commit more family labour on farming activ-
ities. For example, households with access to irrigation
had more members participating because of reduced risk
of crop failure under irrigation. Moreover, access to in-
stitutional and/or organisational support such as exten-
sion, markets, credit or farmer groups were positively
related to farming participation as these also increase
chances of farming success. Agricultural extension of-
ficers remain the main sources of information with re-
gards to new technologies or markets among the rural
households. In South Africa, access to agricultural ex-
tension officers also means higher chances of accessing
government support. Since farming is more likely to
succeed where households have access to government
support, household members are more likely to engage
in farming where success is expected. Further analysis
of the data indicated that households with access to ex-
tension had significantly higher farm income than those
without extension access.
The result that households with better access to mar-
kets supplied more labour to farming than those with
less access to the market is consistent with other studies
in South Africa (e.g., Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; van der
Heijden & Vink, 2013). This highlights the important
role played by access to markets in the success of small-
holder farming. Market access speaks of opportunities
of making good profits out of farming activities and it
is these prospects that encourage households to supply
more labour to farming. This study also demonstrates
the positive role of farmer organisation in smallholder
farming success, in line with what has been reported by
earlier studies (e.g., Hellin et al., 2009; Markelova et al.,
2009; HLPE, 2013; Sinyolo et al., 2014).
The positive and significant credit access estimate
highlights the importance of credit support to the suc-
cess of smallholder producers, as has been reported by
others (Louw, 2013; Rahman & Smolak, 2014). Ac-
cess to credit reduces the liquidity problem that usually
affects the farmers during the planting season and this
enhances the use of agricultural inputs in production, by
ensuring that farmers secure the inputs in time. This
leads to improved agricultural productivity, resulting in
increased farm revenues and incentives for the farmers
to participate more in farming.
Interestingly, whereas one would have expected that
households who own off-farm businesses would be less
committed to farming, the results of this study imply
the opposite (Table 3). This indicates that rural house-
holds diversify their livelihoods and engage on a num-
ber of income generating activities, as has been repor-
ted by several studies (Shackleton et al., 2007; Jacobs
& Makaudze, 2012; Aliber & Mdoda, 2015). Accord-
ing to these studies, households diversify into off-farm
small businesses to supplement farming, not to substi-
tute it. This suggests that starting off-farm businesses
may be motivated by the need to find ways and means to
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relax credit constraints in farming, or raise supplement-
ary income to augment to what they get from farming,
especially during lean seasons.
To conclude, the study indicates that the effect of so-
cial grants on incentives of households to participate
in smallholder farming activities is dependent upon the
contribution levels of the grants. Given the import-
ance of social grants in poverty reduction, the study re-
commends that social grants should continue but policy
makers should be particularly cognisant of their pos-
sible adverse consequences on smallholder farming at
moderate dependency levels. To address the disincent-
ive effects of social grants and ensure successful small-
holder production activities in the rural areas, this study
recommends a holistic approach that addresses both the
social grants side as well as the smallholder farming
side. Policy-makers should aim to find strategies of
reducing social grant-dependency and dis-incentive ef-
fects, while simultaneously creating a conductive envir-
onment to improve the attractiveness, viability and suc-
cess of smallholder farming. The study suggests that in-
troducing and/or supporting existing irrigation schemes
as well as increasing institutional and/or organisational
support could encourage the rural people to participate
more in smallholder farming. This is especially import-
ant in South Africa where the government’s employ-
ment strategy puts agriculture at the core of its drive.
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